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NOTES AND COMMENT
Editor-RUBIN BARON
BANKRuPTCY-Loss OF FUTURE RENT AS PROVABLE CLAIM-
EFFECT OF SECTION 74-A OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT.
"But the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacuo; it is
a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."'
The above quotation from Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion briefly
and accurately describes our theory of the law of leases. From the
days of the early common law a lease has been treated as something
sui generis. A covenant to pay rent has been regarded in an entirely
different light than any other contract and the lessor's rights have
differed radically from those of an ordinary contract creditor.2 A
lease of real property was a contract, but a contract which dealt with
realty and created the relationship of landlord and tenant and the
fundamental rules of realty and that relationship had to be satisfied
before the contract itself would have any binding force between the
parties.
3
This common-law idea of rent is best understood by a reading
of a quotation from Coke upon Littleton:
4
"But if a man letteth land to another for a yeare, to
yeeld to him at the feast of S. Mich. next ensuing 40s. and
afterwards before the same feast he releaseth all actions, yet
after the same feast hee shall have an action of debt for
the non-payment of the 40s. notwithstanding the said release
* **,,
Coke's comment is as follows:
"This release shall not barre the lessor of his rent, be-
cause it was neither debitum nor solvendum at the time of
the release made; for if the land be evicted from the lessee
before the rent became due, the rent is avoyed; for it is to
be paid out of the profits of the land, and it is a thing not
merely in action, because it may be granted over * * *."
1 Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 605, 38 Sup. Ct. 214 (1918).
2 Clark, Foley, Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by
Receivers (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1111.
Radin, Claims for Unaccrued Rent it Bankruptcy (1933) 21 CALIF. L.
REv. 561, 563.
'Co. LiTr. 292b (§513).
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Coke, therefore, says that "rent is reserved out of the profits of the
land." 5 Blackstone says that it "is a profit issuing out of" the
land.6 Tiffany comments on these two statements as follows:
"These statements presumably mean merely that as
stated in the definition above given, rent is in theory part of
the actual or possible profits of the land, a theory which is
no doubt closely related to another theory, that rent, like
any feudal service, is something issuing from and owed by
the land itself, and not by any particular tenant of the land.
The chief consequences of the theory that rent is payable out
of the actual or possible profits of the land are that if the
lessee is deprived of the opportunity to take the profits as
by eviction, the landlord's right to rent ceases or is suspended,
and that, as above stated, the rent is not a debt until the
profits have been taken in the absence of an express provi-
sion to the contrary." 7
So we find that in the common law a covenant to pay rent did not
give rise to a present obligation to render performance in the future.
No obligation arose until the rent day, and if the tenant was de-
prived of possession, even for his own breach, no obligation arose
at all. This of course differs from obligations which arise under
ordinary contracts of an executory nature which give rise to a pres-
ent obligation to render performance in the future, and a material
breach of which, by one of the parties thereto, ordinarily excuses
performance by the other and gives rise to an immediate right to
damages.8
The question arises whether this distinction is followed today.
First let us disregard the legal aspect of the question for the mo-
ment and turn our attention to the situation as regarded by the
landlord and the tenant. We will find that, "We may say that the
landlord thinks of his land as a source of income, an investment
which brings him a return, not differing in kind from other invest-
ments * * *. The tenant on the other hand thinks of his obliga-
tion to pay rent as one of his current expenses. It is counted as
forming part of the cost of running his business and is often a sub-
stantial part of the cost, so that a profit must be earned on that
as well as on other costs, if he is to think of himself as prosperous.
'Co. LITT. 141b.
'2 BL Comm. 41.
1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) §168.
8 Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 213, note 12: "The main distinction between a lease and other executory
contracts is that a material breach of the latter ordinarily excuses further
performance and allows immediate suit for damages. In a lease only specific
performance of the rent covenant is allowed. The landlord must perform and
sue for the stipulated rent."
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It is a recurring charge, but it is not different from the amount due
on notes, on bills for merchandise, on wages and salaries. He will
in an emergency seek to defer payment on one as well as on an-
other. * * * Whatever minute and subtle discriminations courts find
between his rent obligations and his other debts, it is not apparent
that the rent-obligor-the tenant-feels any difference." 9
This, therefore, is the present, common view of the rela-
tionship between landlord and tenant. But to return to the legal
aspect of the question, we find that the courts have steadfastly re-
fused to be swayed from their archaic views of that relationship,
based, as they are, upon the ancient history of our land law. Such
views have given rise to many complicated and unjust results, es-
pecially noticeable in the operation of our bankruptcy law.
The purpose of our present Bankruptcy Act is twofold; 10 to
relieve the debtor from the burden of his overpowering debts, and
to effect an equitable distribution of his assets among his creditors.
The courts by their application of the common-law theory of
leases have frustrated both of these purposes. They hold that bank-
ruptcy does not cancel the lease and the tenant remains liable for
future rent as it accrues.'" The individual tenant is, then, still bur-
dened with the obligation of carrying out the terms of the lease
and, having been stripped of all his assets by the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, his chances for reorganization are very slim. They also hold
that the landlord may only file his proof of claim for rent that has
accrued prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.12  Thus
'Radin, loc. cit. supra note 3.
log,*  To convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution
among the creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh, free from the obliga-
tions and responsibilities, consequent upon business misfortunes." Williams v.
U. S. Fidelity Co., 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211 (1918) ; see also Williams v.
U. S. F. & G. Co., 236 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct. 289 (1915) ; Central Trust Co.
v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916);
Maynard v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390 (1931).
'In re Goldberg, 52 F. (2d) 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); In re Hubbard, 57
F. (2d) 213 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); see In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1910); In re Sherwoods, Inc., 210 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913);
In re Frischknecht, 223 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
"But the better and more logical rule is that the bankruptcy of the tenant
even, does not sever the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the tenant and
his surety remain liable and that the rent obligation is not discharged as to
future rent, unless the trustee elects to retain the lease as an asset." 2 R.m-
iNGTO N, BANKRUPTCY (3rd ed. 1923) §789.
'Hendricks v. Judah, 2 Caines 25 (N. Y. 1804); Lansing v. Pendergast,
9 Johns. 127 (N. Y. 1812); Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & S. 183 (Pa. 1844);
Stinemets v. Ainslie, 4 Denio 573 (N. Y. 1847) ; Savory v. Stocking, 4 Cush.
607 (Mass. 1849); Bailey v. Loeb, Fed. Cas. No. 739 (C. C. M. D. Ala.
1875); In re Commercial Bulletin Co., Fed. Cas. No. 3,060 (C. C. D. La.
1876); .Ex parte Houghton, Fed. Cas. No. 6,725 (D. C. D. Mass. 1871); In re
Hufnagel, Fed. Cas. No. 6,837 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1875); Ex parte Lake,
Fed. Cas. No. 7,991 (D. C. D. Mass. 1877) ; In re May, Fed. Cas. No. 9,325(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1874); In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967 (D. Mass. 1900); Bray
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the landlord is not allowed to share equitably with the other credi-
tors who are allowed to prove not only debts actually owing but
damages suffered from breaches of contracts. He must look to the
bankrupt tenant for the remainder of his return under the lease, or,
of his own volition bring the term to an end and look for a new
tenant. This hardship is especially flagrant where the tenant is a
corporation dissolved after bankruptcy.
Thus the purposes and aims of the Bankruptcy Act are, as
already stated, frustrated and there has been a continuous endeavor
to amend this situation and to apply to the relationship of landlord
and tenant the usual rules of contract or to read into the Act an
intention on the part of the legislature to allow future rent claims
to be proved in bankruptcy. This is by no means a new or modern
movement. Various attempts have been made to accomplish the
same ends under all of our Bankruptcy Acts.
The first attempts arose under our first Bankruptcy Act passed
in 1800 and were entirely unsuccessful. The Act permitted claims
of a contingent nature, but these claims were expressly limited to
a small class not including rent 13 and the cases tried under this
statute so decided. 14
v. Cobb, 100 Fed. 270 (E. D. N. C. 1900) ; In re Mahler, 105 Fed. 595 (E. D.
Mich. 1900); Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900); In re
Hays, Foster & Ward Co., 117 Fed. 879 (N. D. Ky. 1902); Watson v. Merrill,
136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; In re Pettingill & Co., 137 Fed. 143 (D.
Mass. 1905); In re Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (E. D. Wis. 1908); In re Roth &
Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 416
(C. C. A. 1st, 1910); Colman Co. v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 9th,
1912) ; In re Scruggs, 205 Fed. 673 (S. D. Ala. 1913) ; In re Sapinsky & Sons,
206 Fed. 523 (W. D. Ky. 1913); In re Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58(C. C. A. 2d, 1916); McDonnell v. Woods, 298 Fed. 434 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924);
Britton v. Western Iowa Co., 9 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Wells v.
Twenty-first Street Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); In re
Hook, 25 F. (2d) 498 (D. Md. 1928); In re Barton Co., 34 F. (2d) 517(D. N. H. 1929) ; In re Twentieth Century Millinery Exchange, 41 F. (2d) 237(S. D. N. Y. 1930); Trust Co. of Georgia v. Whitehall Holding Co., 53 F.(2d) 635 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) ; In re Metropolitan Chain Stores, Inc., 66 F.(2d) 482 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Orr v. Neilly, 67 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 5th,
1933). Contra: In re Chakos, 24 F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928). The
cases in the third circuit reach a different conclusion because they turn upon a
special form of lease drawn to take advantage of a local statutory provision.
Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1902) ; South
Side Trust Co. v. Watson, 200 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912) ; In re H. M.
Lacker Co., 251 Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918); Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 Fed.
584 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919).
" Act of Congress approved April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19, §39. "* * * the
obligee of any bottomry or respondentia bond, and the assured in any policy
of insurance, shall be admitted to claim, and after the contingency or loss, to
prove the debt thereon, in like manner as if the same had happened before
issuing the commission; and the bankrupt shall be discharged from such
securities, as if such money had been due and payable before the time of his
or her becoming bankrupt."
" Hendricks v. Judah, Lansing v. Pendergast, both .supra note 12.
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The second Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1847. The section
dealing with provable claims listed several classes of contingent
claims which would be allowed but did not include rent. The sec-
tion, however, also contained a definition of all contingent claims 15
but the courts held that future rent claims were not such contingent
claims as to be susceptible of liquidation.16
The section describing provable claims in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1867 specifically allowed proof of contingent claims and rent up
to the time of the bankruptcy.17 The courts under this section re-
fused claims for future rent on the ground that it was not a con-
tingent claim or on the theory that the legislature by expressly al-
lowing claims for rent up to the date of the bankruptcy, impliedly
excluded claims for rent to accrue after that date.1 8
In 1898 our fourth and present Bankruptcy Act was passed. Sec-
tion 63 of that Act deals with the provability of claims. The exact
wording of that section, as far as is necessary for this discussion,
is as follows:
"Section 63.19 Debts which nmy be proved. (a) Debts
of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his es-
tate which are (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judg-
ment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the
time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then
payable or not, with any interest thereon which would have
been recoverable at that date or with a rebate of interest
'Act of Congress of August 19, 1841, §5, 5 Stat., 440, 444. "* * * all
creditors whose debts are not due and payable until a future day, all annuitants,
holders of bottomry and respondentia bonds, holders of policies of insurances,
sureties, indorsers, bail, or other persons, having uncertain or\ contingent
demands against such bankrupt, shall be permitted to come in and prove such
debts or claims under the act, and shall have a right, when their debts and
claims become absolute to have the same allowed them, and such annuitants and
holders of debts payable in future may have the present value thereof ascer-
tained, under the direction of such court, and allowed them accordingly, as
debts in presenti. * * *"
" Bosler v. Kuhn, Stinemets v. Ainslie, Savory v. Stocking, all supra
note 12.
" Act of March 2, 1867, §19, 14 Stat. 517, 525. "* * * In all cases of
contingent debts and contingent liabilities contracted by the bankrupt, and not
herein otherwise provided for, the creditor may make claim therefor, and have
his claim allowed, with the right to share in the dividends, if the contingency
shall happen before the order for the final dividend; or he may at any time
apply to the court to have the present value of the debt or liability ascertained
and liquidated, and shall then be done in such manner as the court shall order,
and he shall be allowed to prove for the amount so ascertained. * * *
"Where the bankrupt is liable to payment or other debt falling due at
fixed and stated periods, the creditor may prove for a proportionate part
thereof up to the time of the bankruptcy, as if the same grew due day to day,
and not at such fixed and stated periods."
': Bailey v. Loeb, In re Commercial Bulletin Co., Ex parte Houghton, In
re Hufnagel, Ex parte Lake, In re May, all supra note 12.
"30 STAT. 562 (1898), 110 U. S. C. §103 (1926).
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upon such as were not then payable and did not bear interest;
* * * (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract
expressed or implied; * * *
"(b) Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may,
pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such
manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and
allowed against his estate." 20
It will be noted that subdivision (1) is limited to claims abso-
lutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition while subdivision
(4) is not so limited. Nevertheless the lower federal courts read
this limitation into the latter subdivision and refused to allow any
contingent claims against the bankrupt's estate, 21 including, of course,
claims for future rent. Such a result was to be expected. "The
history of bankruptcy legislation both in England and in the United
States 22 pointed to such a result, for never had proof of contingent
claims been allowed under statutes which like the present Act made
no express provision therefor; and statutes designed to permit proof
of such claims had been construed in a ruthlessly narrow and tech-
nical fashion." 23
Having been thus thwarted in their efforts to prove their claims
for future rent in bankruptcy, due to the peculiar law applicable to
leases, landlords have attempted to remedy this situation by employ-
ing express covenants in their leases. Knowing that at common law
the landlord could enforce a covenant for damages even after evic-
tion, they believed that the same would hold true in bankruptcy
proceedings. Their view was further strengthened by a decision
of the Supreme Court allowing a claim for damages in an equity
receivership, based upon a covenant in a lease, where no such
claim would have been allowed in the absence of such covenant.24
But once again the landlords were doomed to disappointment
for most of the covenants usually employed in leases met with very
slight success. The majority of the federal courts refused claims
'In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 761 (1903),
the court, after refusing a claim by the bankrupt's wife on his contract to pay
his divorced wife a specified amount annually so long as she should remain
unmarried, on the ground that the contingency was such as to make any valua-
tion of the claim impossible, said that §63-b added nothing to the category
of provable claims, but only provided for the liquidation of claims otherwise
provable under §63-a.
In re Hutchcraft, 247 Fed. 187 (E. D. Ky. 1917) ; First National Bank
of Pikeville v. Elliot, 19 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; see Schwabacher
& Weinstein, loc. cit. supra note 8; Note (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv. 372; Note
(1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 172.
'For a study of the history of provable claims in bankruptcy in England
and the United States and an analysis of the cases under the various acts, see
Schwabacher & Weinstein, loc. cit. supra note 8.
= Ibid.
' Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. 211 (1918).
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based on such covenants holding that they were too contingent, or
in the nature of a penalty. The leading case on the point and one
that is continually cited as authority is In re Roth & Appel.25 In
this case the landlord had reserved to himself the right of re-entry
and the tenant agreed to pay the landlord the difference between the
rents collected after re-entry and those reserved in the lease. After
the petition in bankruptcy had been filed the landlord re-entered and
relet the premises at a lower rental. The court, however, refused his
claim for the deficiency, saying:
"Now when the petition was filed, the first step toward
declaring the lessee bankrupt was taken. It was not certain
that bankruptcy would follow, but, if it did follow, the lessor
would have the right to re-enter and terminate the lease. * * *
But the lessor was not obliged to re-enter, and whether he
would do so or not was manifestly dependent upon uncertain-
ties. Indeed, looking at the claim as it existed either at the
time of the petition or the adjudication, it was altogether con-
tingent in its nature:
"(1) It was uncertain, as just pointed out, whether the
lessor would re-enter and terminate the lease.
"(2) In case the lease was terminated it was uncertain
whether there would be any loss in rents. * ** 1" 26
It is claimed that both of these reasons have been nullified by
two subsequent cases, both of which, however, do not deal with
realty. The first case is the Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n2 7 in which the bankrupt had leased from the
claimant a cab privilege and covenanted to make certain annual pay-
ments to the lessor who had the right to revoke the privilege. The
lessee becoming bankrupt, the court held that he had disabled himself
from fulfilling his contract and therefore, said the court, there was
an anticipatory breach of contract and the lessor's claim was provable
even though, as Judge Hand points out, "the uncertainties attendant
upon any future installments were as great as in the case of a cove-
nant to pay rent under a lease." 28
The second case was that of Maynard v. Elliot.29 In this case
the claimant was the holder of a note not yet due, upon which the
bankrupt was an endorser. The Supreme Court allowed the claim,
holding that contingent claims are provable in bankruptcy and that
181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
SId. at 671.
'240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916).
'Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 66 F. (2d) 470 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933).
'283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390 (1931).
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§63-a (4) of the Bankruptcy Act should not be interpreted to pro-
hibit a claim upon a contract merely because the obligation was not
absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition.
30
It was, therefore, with renewed vigor that this question of
provability of future rent claims was placed before the courts in two
recent cases. The question had acquired widespread notice due to
the prevalent use by tenants, especially the chain store companies, of
the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act to relieve themselves of the
burden of financially disastrous leases during the last few years of
economic stress. The question was further advanced by the passage
of §74-a, which was one of the sections added to the Bankruptcy Act
in 1933 which were enacted to permit extensions and compositions.
Section 74-a provided that a claim for future rent shall constitute a
provable debt and shall be liquidated under §63-b of the Act. It
was thought by some that this provision might apply to all proceed-
ings in bankruptcy, while the prevailing opinion was that it only
applied to the new relief actions granted to debtors under the com-
positions and extensions provided for in the newly added sections
from 73 to 77.31
These two cases arose in the district court for the district of
New York where the court followed the old-time honored rule
against the provability of claims for future rents and expunged the
claims. Appeals were taken to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit which followed its earlier decision
in In re Roth & Appel.3 2 Justice Hand, who wrote the prevailing
opinion, nevertheless dissented in the reasoning, while forced to
follow in result due to the doctrine of stare decisis. The cases came
to the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari and were decided
together. For the first time the Supreme Court of the land had an
opportunity to pass upon the precise point. In both cases the leases
contained covenants similar to that passed upon in In re Roth &
Appel,33 giving the landlord the right to re-enter and terminate the
lease if bankruptcy should ensue and containing a promise on the
tenant's part to pay the landlord any deficiency between the rent
collected and that which was reserved in the lease for the remainder
of the term.
' The court said: "Although the omission to any reference to contingent
claims in section 63 of the present Act has led to some confusion and uncer-
tainty in fie decisions, it is now settled that claims founded upon contracts,
which at the time of the bankruptcy are fixed in amount or susceptible liquida-
tion, may be proved under subdivision (a) (4) of that section, although not
absolutely owing when the petition is filed." Supra, note 29 at 275.
"It is, however, further provided that 'a claim for future rent shall consti-
tute a provable debt and shall be liquidated under section 63-b.' This provision
is clearly applicable to composition proceedings under section 74; whether,
however, it is applicable to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings admits of some
doubt, since it appears a part of section 74 and not as an amendment to
section 63." Schwabacher & Weinstein, loc. cit. supra note 8.
'Sura note 12.
"Ibid.
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The court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, stressing the legislative history of the bankruptcy laws
passed by Congress and the preponderant construction of them by
the courts.
34
First the court considered the provability of rent claims in gen-
eral. After an exhaustive study of the history of bankruptcy law
on this point both in England and the United States, the court, per
Mr. Justice Roberts, said:
"This court has never had occasion to pass upon the
precise point. It has not, however, expressed disapproval of
the rulings of the great majority of the lower federal courts,
and has cited many of their decisions with apparent approba-
tion (see Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Associa-
tion, 240 U. S. 581, 589-590; Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed,
245 U. S. 597; Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 605;
Maynard v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 278).
"In accord with the well nigh unanimous view of the
federal courts reiterated for over thirty years are statements
of leading text writers (COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, vol. 2, p.
1422; REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, Vol. 2, secs. 79, 793; LOVE-
LAND, BANKRUPTCY, Vol. 1, sec. 313).
"What of the activities of the Congress while this body
of decisions interpreting section 6 3-a was growing? From
1898 to 1932 the Bankruptcy Act was amended eight times
without alteration of the section. This is persuasive that the
contruction adopted by the courts has been acceptable to the
legislative arm of the government.
"In this situation 'only compelling language in the statute
itself would warrant the rejection of a construction so long
and so generally accepted' (Maynard v. Elliot, supra, 277).
If the rule is to be changed Congress should so declare." 35
As for §74-a, the court held it only applied to individuals and
not to corporations and then went on to say, "It is highly unlikely
that if the quoted sentence had been intended as an amendment of
section 63-a it would have been placed in context dealing only with
the novel procedure authorized by the new sections." 36 So the land-
lord's newest hope for relief from his unhappy situation, even
though meager, was not well founded.
The court then considered the particular covenants involved in
these two cases. As was stated before, the covenants gave the lessors
the option to terminate the leases by re-entry and then to collect from
Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 385 (1934);
S. R. Brown v. Irving Trust Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 385 (1934).T*Ibid.CIbld.
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the former tenant the difference between the rent collected by the
landlord by reletting the premises and the rent reserved in the leases
for the remainder of the terms. The court regarded this as a new
and complete contract which would not come into existence until
after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and then only at the
choice of the claimant. This contract, the court says, cannot be
breached until the duty to indemnify the landlord arises and which
will not be complete until the end of the term. There can be no
debt provable in bankruptcy arising out of a contract which becomes
effective only at the claimant's option and after the inception of the
proceedings, the fulfillment of which is contingent on what may
happen from month to month or up to the end of the original
term." 37 It is difficult to see how this statement in its entirety can
be reconciled with the opinion of the same court in Central Trust
Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n 38 and in Maynard v. Elliot.
3 9
No doubt, through a strict construction or interpretation of the
statute, the decision of the Supreme Court can be justified and
defended. But can the strict construction be justified? It is difficult
to see why a strict interpretation is to be employed when dealing
with realty while a liberal interpretation is to be used when dealing
with matters relating to personalty. Surely §63 makes no such
distinction. If it is to be construed to allow contingent claims in one
instance, then why not in the other? The court cannot seriously
hope to answer this question by saying that the liquidation of the
claim for damages for the breach of a lease of realty is too difficult
to ascertain, while damages for the breach of a lease of a bus privi-
lege are easy to ascertain. Quite obviously there is a greater market,
and, consequently, a more readily ascertainable market price for
realty than there is for a bus privilege. Then, too, it is difficult to
see how a claim for unaccrued rent is more contingent than a claim
against an endorser on a note not yet due. Yet the court finds some
distinction between the two, a distinction which it confines within the
workings of its own mind, and, having settled upon the distinction
proceeds to render an opinion based upon the doctrine of stare decisis.
The writer is a firm believer in the above-mentioned doctrine and
does not, by any means, advocate the overthrow of long-respected
authorities, but feels that when reason and logic, usefulness and
expediency have long vanished from the principle sought to be
upheld, the court should be free-in fact, should find it its duty-to
depart from the archaic doctrine which has outlived its usefulness.
The strongest argument put forth by the court against the
provability of future rent claims was the history of Bankruptcy in
the United States. Great stress was laid upon the decisions under
our present Act and the fact that Congress has amended the Act
eight times without altering the section dealing with provable claims,
Ibid.
Supra note 27.
"Supra note 29.
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showing, says the court, that this was the intent of Congress when
the Act was adopted and that Congress is fully satisfied with the
interpretation of the courts of this section with regard to rent claims.
One might, with all due respect, ask why the same argument was
not applied in the case of Maynard v. Elliot 40 in which the Supreme
Court decided that contingent claims were provable under the pres-
ent Act. It is equally applicable. As we have stated before, the
first three Bankruptcy Acts adopted by Congress expressly allowed
contingent claims. In the first two the contingent claims allowed
were listed, while the third allowed contingent claims generally,
excepting, by more or less express language, future rent. The fourth
and present Act, however, says absolutely nothing about contingent
claims. Might it not be said that such action on the part of Congress
showed an intent that no contingent claims should be allowed? Stat-
utes of a like nature were so construed in England before our pres-
ent Act was adopted. 41 And our own courts for many years so
interpreted the Act of 1898 without any interference or alteration
by Congress, 42 showing, one might readily say, the "construction
adopted by the courts has been acceptable to the legislative arm of
the government." 43 But in 1931 the Supreme Court decided that
contingent claims are provable under the present section.44 One is
forced to conclude that they are irreconcilable decisions.
The Supreme Court does not, however, eternally condemn the
landlord to stand in trembling and fear of the ever-threatening bank-
ruptcy of his tenant. They hold out one faint and flickering beacon
of salvation to him. Being reluctant to change a rule so long im-
bedded in our land law, reluctant to place a different interpretation
on the Bankruptcy Act than that established so long by the decisions
of the lower courts, with the apparent sanction of the legislature,
leaving a bad situation where it finds it, the Supreme Court of the
United States holds out this parting word of advice:
"If the rule is to be changed Congress should so
declare." 45
HAROLD V. DixoN.
PARTY WALLS-NATURE-CREATION-TERMINATION.
From the layman's point of view, a party wall is a wall erected
on a line between adjoining property-owners and used in common.'
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